This paper contributes to the literature on hedonic models in two ways. First, it makes use of Queyranne's reformulation of a hedonic model in the discrete case as a network ‡ow problem in order to provide a proof of existence and integrality of a hedonic equilibrium and e¢ cient computational techniques of hedonic prices. Second, elaborating on entropic methods developped in Galichon and Salanié (2014) , this paper proposes a new identi…cation strategy for hedonic models in a single market. This methodology allows one to introduce heterogeneities in both consumers'and producers'attributes and to recover producers'pro…ts and consumers'utilities based on the observation of production and consumption patterns and the set of hedonic prices.
Introduction
Starting with Court (1941) , Griliches (1961) and Lancaster (1966) , a large literature has aimed at providing a theoretical framework for pricing the attributes of highly di¤erentiated goods. While this literature was initially mainly empirical in nature and early contributions lacked a proper theoretical setting, the …rst theoretical treatments of hedonic models appeared in Tinbergen (1956) and Rosen (1974) . Tinbergen (1956 ) presents a stylized model in which preferences are quadratic and attributes normally distributed. Rosen (1974) showed the theoretical relation of hedonic prices to marginal willingness to produce and marginal willingness to consume. Hedonic models have also been used to study the pricing of highly di¤erentiated products such as houses (Kain and Quigley, 1970) , wine and champagne (Golan and Shalit, 1993) , automobiles quality (Triplett, 1969) among others but also set forth a new literature on the Value of Statistical Life following Thaler and Rosen's (1976) original idea of seeing jobs attributes and in particular "risk taken on the job" as a vector of hedonic attributes valued on the labor market. More recently, signi…cant progress on the understanding of the properties of hedonic models (properties of an equilibrium, identi…cation of deep parameters etc.) has been achieved. These developments are to a large extent due to Ivar Ekeland's contributions, see e.g. Ekeland et al. (2004) and Ekeland (2010) , and it is a pleasure to dedicate to him the present piece of work in recognition of our intellectual debt for him.
In this paper we contribute to the hedonic literature in two ways. First, we elaborate on an idea of Maurice Queyranne who reformulated the hedonic model in the discrete case as a network ‡ow problem. This reformulation allows us to derive results on existence of a hedonic equilibrium in the discrete case, and it allows the use of powerful computational techniques to solve for the equilibrium. Second, building on recent development in the matching model literature and in particular the seminal contribution due to Choo and Siow (2006) generalized by Galichon and Salanié (2014), we introduce heterogeneities (unobserved by the econometrician) in producer and consumer types. This formalism has two advantages: (i) it allows for the incorporation of unobserved heterogeneity in the producers and consumers characteristics, and (ii) it provides straightforward identi…cation results. Indeed, we follow Galichon and Salanié in making use of the convex duality in discrete choice problems to recover utilities from choice probabilities on both side of the market.
2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the properties of an equilibrium in hedonic model and its reformulation as a network ‡ow problem. Section 3 introduces a model with unobserved heterogeneities on both sides of the market and studies the identi…cation of preference parameters. The discussion in Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Equilibrium, existence and properties
Hedonic equilibrium
The model. Throughout this paper, X is the set of observable types of producers of a given good, and Y the set of observable types of consumers of that good. This good comes in various qualities; let Z be the set of the good's qualities. The sets X , Y and Z are assumed to be …nite. It is assumed that there is a supply n x (resp. m y ) of producers (resp. consumers) of type x (resp. y). It is assumed that producers (resp. consumers) can produce (consume) at most one unit of good. They have the option not to participate in the market, in which case they choose z = 0.
For example, hedonic models can be used to model the market for …ne wines 1 . In that case, X may be the set of observable characteristics of wine producers (say, grapes used, average amount of sunshine, and harvesting technology), and Y may be the set of observable characteristics of wine consumers (say country and purchasing channel). Z will be the quality of the wine (say acidity, sugar content, expert rating).
Let p z be the price of the good of quality z. If a producer of type x produces the good in quality z, the payo¤ to the producer is xz + p z , where xz 2 R [ f 1g is the producer's productivity (the opposite of a production cost). Similarly, if the consumer of type y consumes the good in quality z, the payo¤ to the consumer is yz p z , where yz 2 R [ f 1g is the utility of the consumer 2 . Producers and consumers who do not participate in the market get a surplus of zero.
Supply and demand. Let xz be the supply function, that is the number of producers of type x o¤ering quality z; similarly, zy is the demand function, the number of consumers of type y demanding quality z. One has X z2Z xz n x ; X z2Z zy m y where the di¤erence between the right-hand side and the left-hand side of these inequalities is the number of producers of type x (resp. consumers of type y) deciding to opt out of the market. The market clearing condition for quality z expresses that the total quantity of good of quality z produced is equal to the total quantity consumed, that is X
(it is assumed that there is no free disposal; if free disposal is assumed the equality is replaced by in the expression).
Equilibrium prices. At equilibrium, each producer x will optimize its production behavior given the price vector (p z ); hence if producing quality z 0 yields strictly more pro…t than producing quality z, then quality z will not be produced at all; that is xz + p z < xz 0 + p z 0 for some z 0 implies xz = 0. A similar condition holds for consumers.
One can now state a formal de…nition. De…nition 2.1 (Hedonic equilibrium). Let (p z ) z2Z be a price vector, xz a supply function, and yz a demand function. Then:
(a) (p; ) is called a hedonic equilibrium whenever the following three conditions are all veri…ed:
(i) People counting: the number of producers of type x actually participating in the market does not exceed the total number of agents of type x, and similarly for consumers of type y. That is, for any x and y, X (ii) Market clearing: for any z, supply for quality z will equate demand, that is X
(iii) Rationality: no producer or consumer chooses a quality that is suboptimal. That is, given (x; y; z; z 0 ), then
(b) If n x and m y are integer, (p; ) is called an integral equilibrium whenever (p; ) is a hedonic equilibrium and all the entries are integers.
The indirect utility u x of a producer of type x and the indirect utility v y of a consumer of type y are given by u x = G x ( x: + p : ) and v y = H y :y p : , where G and H are respectively the indirect surpluses of producers and consumers, de…ned by
where a + denotes the positive part of a. As a result, if p z is an equilibrium price, then for all x, y and z, u x xz + p z and v y zy p z , thus yz v y p z u x xz . Therefore:
Proposition 2.1. For a given optimal solution u and v, the set of equilibrium prices are the prices p z such that
where
As a result, u x + v y xz + yz , hence
thus, as observed by Chiappori, McCann and Nesheim (2010), u and v are the stable payo¤s of the assignment game in transferable utility with surplus xy = max z xz + yz . In the next paragraph, we shall go beyond this equivalence by seeing a reformulation of the hedonic model as a network ‡ow problem. 5 
Network ‡ow formulation
Interestingly, as understood by Maurice Queyranne, the hedonic equilibrium problem can be reformulated as a network ‡ow problem. This reformulation will be of particular interest since, as we show below, it help us establish the existence of a hedonic equilibrium and provides the building blocks to compute an equilibrium. While the present exposition is as self-contained as possible, a good reference for network ‡ow problems is Ahuja, Magnanti and Orlin (1993).
The network. De…ne a set of nodes by N = X [ Z [ Y, and a set of arcs A which is a subset of N N and is such that if ww 0 2 A, then w 0 w = 2 A. Here, the set of arcs is
A vector is de…ned as an element of R A . Here, we introduce the following direct surplus vector such that w i w i+1 2 A for each i. T is the length of the path. Here, the only nontrivial paths are of length 2 and are of the form (xz) ; (zy) where x 2 X , z 2 Z and y 2 Y.
For two nodes w and w 0 , we de…ne the reduced surplus, or indirect surplus as the surplus associated to the optimal path from w to w 0 . Here, for x 2 X , y 2 Y, the indirect suplus xy of producer x and consumer y is
For w 2 N , we let N w be the algebraic quantity of mass leaving the network at w. Hence N w is the ‡ow of mass being consumed (N w > 0) or produced (N w < 0) at w. The nodes such that N w < 0 (resp. N w = 0 and N w > 0) are called the source nodes, whose set is denoted S (resp. intermediate nodes I and target nodes T ). Here, for x 2 X , y 2 Y, and z 2 Z, we set N x := n x ; N y := m y ; N z := 0 (2.9)
so that the set of source nodes is S := X , the set of intermediate nodes is I := Z, and the set of target nodes is T := Y.
Gradient, ‡ows. We de…ne a potential as an element of R N . We de…ne the gradient matrix as the matrix of general term r aw , a 2 A, w 2 N such that r aw = 1 if a is out of w, r aw = 1 if a is into w, r aw = 0 else, so that, for a potential f 2 R N , rf is the vector such that for a = ww 0 2 A, one has (rf ) ww 0 = f w 0 f w . Here, set the potential of surpluses U as
We de…ne the divergence matrix r (sometimes also called node-edge, or incidence matrix
3 ) as the transpose of the gradient matrix: r xa := r ax . As a result, for a vector v,
A ‡ow is a nonnegative vector 2 R A + that satis…es the balance of mass equation 4 , that is (N r ) w 0; w 2 S (2.12) (N r ) w = 0; w 2 I (2.13) (N r ) w 0; w 2 T (2.14) and by complementary slackness, for w 2 S [ T ; U w > 0 implies N w = (r ) w . A standard result is that if N has only integral entries, then (2.15) has an integral solution .
Here the solution U of (2.16) is related to the solution to the hedonic model by Equations (2.10), that is u x = U x ; p z = U z ; v y = U y . Using (2.11) and (2.7), rU implies u x p z = U z U x xz = xz and v y + p z = U y U z zy = zy , thus, using complementary slackness one recovers
Further, if n and m have only integral entries, then there is an integral solution to (2.15). Therefore:
Theorem 2.1 (Queyranne) . The hedonic equilibrium problem of Theorem 2.2 can be reformulated as a matching ‡ow problem as described above.
As announced above, this reformulation has several advantages. First, it establishes the existence of a hedonic equilibrium, and its integrality.
Theorem 2.2 (Existence)
. Consider a market given by n x producers of type x, m y consumers of type y, and where productivity of producer x is given by xz , and utility of consumer y is yz .Then:
(i) There exists a hedonic equilibrium p z ; xz ; yz ; (ii) xz ; yz are solution to the primal problem of the expression of the social welfare expressed equivalently as min pz P x n x G x ( x: + p : )+ P y m y H y :y p : , where the indirect surpluses G x and H y are de…ned in (2.3).
(iii) If n x and m y are integral for each x and y, then xz and yz can be taken integral.
Second, on the practical side, Theorem 2.2 also has a useful consequence in terms of computation of the equilibrium, as shown in the following corollary.
Corollary 2.1. The equilibrium prices (p z ) as well as the quantities xz ; yz supplied at equilibrium can be determined using one of the many maximum ‡ows algorithms, see for instance Ahuja, Magnanti and Orlin (1993).
Example 2.1. Assume that there are four sellers and three buyers, each of whom is unique among her type, and three qualities. Participation is endogenous but there is no free disposal. Assume that the technology and preference parameters are given by 6 10), and the optimal matching will consist in matching x 1 with y 2 , which produce together quality 2, and any other two remaining producers with the two other remaining consumers, producing two units of quality of quality 3. Hence the optimal production of quality is l x 1 = 0, l x 2 = 1 and l x 3 = 2. Making use of p 
Introducing heterogeneities
In the spirit of Galichon and Salanié (2014) , who extended the model of Choo and Siow (2006), we are now going to introduce heterogeneities in producers'and consumers'characteristics. As before, we consider the set X of observable types of producers, the set Y of observable types of consumers, and Z be the set of qualities, and the sets X , Y and Z are …nite 5 . In the sequel, i will denote an individual producer, and j will denote an individual consumer. The analyst observes the "observable type" x i 2 X of producer i, and the "observable type" y j 2 Y of consumer j. Two producers (resp. consumers) sharing the same observable type may di¤er in some additional heterogeneity term that will a¤ect their pro…tability (resp. utility) function. This heterogeneity is observed by the consumers but not by the analyst. It is assumed that the quality z 2 Z is fully observable by all parties and the analyst.
If the price of quality z is p z , then the pro…t of an individual producer i selling quality z is de…ned as~ iz + p z 2 R [ f 1g, and the utility of an individual consumer j purchasing z is de…ned as~ jz p z 2 R [ f 1g. If producer i (resp. consumer j) does not participate in the market, she gets a surplus of~ i0 (resp.~ j0 ). The tilde notation in~ and~ indicates that these terms characterize the invididual level, which will be random from the point of view of the observer. Note that the utility of agents on each side of the market still does not depend directly on the type of the agent with whom they match, but only indirectly via the type of the contract.
Structure of the heterogeneity
We introduce an structural assumption regarding the structure of unobserved heterogeneity.
Assumption 3.1. Assume that the pre-transfer pro…tability and utility terms have structure~
where:
a) The surplus shock, or unobserved heterogeneity component " i of all producers of observable characteristics x i are drawn from the same distribution
b) The surplus shock, or unobserved heterogeneity component j of all consumers of observable characteristics y j are drawn from the same distribution Q y j .
c) The distributions P and Q have full support.
Part a) and b) of this assumption are not very restrictive. They essentially express that the quality z is fully observed. Part c) is more restrictive. It implies that for each type of producer or consumer, and for any quality, some individual of this type will produce or consume this quality. This assumption does not hold if, say, some technological constraint prevents some producers to produce a given quality. Although this assumption is not required, and is not needed in Galichon and Salanié (2014) , it greatly simpli…es the results on identi…cation and we will maintain it for the purposes of this paper.
We will also assume that:
There is a large number of producers and consumers of each given observable type, and each of them are price takers.
This assumption has two virtues. First, it implies that we can have a statistical description of the producers and the consumer of a given type and we do not need to worry about sample variations. Second, it rules out any strategic behaviour by agents: the market here is assumed perfectly competitive.
Social welfare
We now investigate the social welfare, understood as the sum of the producers' and consumers'surpluses. We …rst focus on the side of producers. At equilibrium, producer i will get utility
from producing quality z, where
The sum of the ex-ante indirect surpluses of the producers of observable type x is n x G x (U x ), where G x (U x ) is the expected indirect utility of a consumer of type x, that is
where U x denotes the vector of (U xz ) z2Z , and where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution P x of unobserved heterogeneity component " i . By the Envelope theorem, the number of producers of type x choosing quality z, denoted zjx , is given by
This result sheds light on the equilibrium characterization problem: based on the vector of producer surpluses U , this allows to deduce the production patterns , and a similar picture holds on the consumers' side. However, the identi…cation problem consists in recovering utility parameters, here U x based on the observation of producer'choices, here summarized by xz , the number of producers of observable type x who choose to sell quality z. This requires inverting relation (3.2). To do this, still following Galichon and Salanié (2014) , introduce the Legendre-Fenchel transform G x of G x as
where :jx is the vector of choice probabilities zjx z2Z . By the Envelope theorem, one has
Hence U xz is identi…ed from x: by equation (3.4). Galichon and Salanié (2014) have shown that G can be very e¢ ciently computed as the solution to an optimal matching problem.
Similarly to the producers'side of the market, denote V yz = yz p z the deterministic part of the consumer's payo¤ from buying good quality z, and write V y for the jZj-dimensional vector with z-th component V yz . The sum of expected utilities of consumers with observable characteristics y is given by m y H y (V y: ), where H y (V y: ) is the expected indirect utility of a consumer of type y, that is
and Q y is the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity component j for a consumer indexed by j, with observable characteristics y = y j . Hence, as in the producer's case, we obtain identi…cation of V yz through the following relation.
where H y is the convex conjugate of H y , de…ned by a formula similar to (3.3) .
Recall that the social welfare W is the sum of the producers and consumers surpluses. We are now able to state the following result. 
m y H y y: :
(iii) Further the equilibrium p z ; xz ; yz is unique and is such that (p z ) is a minimizer for (3.6) and xz ; yz is a maximizer for (3.7). where x0 = n x P y2Y xy and 0y = m y P x2X xy .
Identi…cation
As a result of the …rst order conditions in the previous theorem, the model is exactly identi…ed from the observation of the hedonic prices p z , along with the production and consumption patterns xz and yz .
Theorem 3.2. The producers and consumers systematic surpluses at equilibrium U and V are identi…ed from xz and yz by
Hence and are identi…ed from xz , yz and p z by
14

Discussion
The results presented in this paper are applicable to many di¤erent empirical settings. Returning to the market for …ne wines for example, the analyst will typically have access to data about the share of consumers with observable characteristics y purchasing wine of quality z and the share of producers of type x selling wine of quality z. Our methodology allows to identify the surpluses of consumers and producers from these data. If in addition, the price of wine of various qualities are observed, then the utility of consumers and technology of producers are identi…ed as well. Next, consider the marriage market example. In classical models of sorting on the marriage market, following Becker (1973) and Shapley and Shubik (1972) , the matching surplus between a man of type x and a woman of type y is xy = xy + xy where and are the man and the woman's surplus for being married to eachother. However, this analysis misses the fact that the partners in the marriage market also need to make a number of joint decisions, such as whether/when/how to raise children, where to live, how to spend their spare time together, etc. This has the ‡avour of a hedonic model. For the sake of discussion, consider (on the other extreme) a framework where the observed characteristics is, say, the date of birth of each agent, and where the only variable agents care about is, say, the date of birth of their …rst child. In this context, the matching surplus is now xy = sup z ( xz + yz ) and the methodology developed in this paper can identify the surplus of a man born in x = 1985 to have his …rst child in say z = 2012 and the surplus of a woman born in y = 1986 to have her …rst child in z = 2013. The required data are the shares of men and women born in a given year who had their …rst child in a given year. This example, however, is peculiar as men and women are likely to form preferences not only over the hedonic attribute z, i.e. the year of birth of …rst child, but also over their spouse's attributes x and y. One therefore needs to consider a model encompassing the hedonic model a la Rosen (1974) with the sorting model à la Becker (1973) . In this model, developed and studied in Dupuy and Galichon and Zhao (2014) who apply it to the study of migration in China, the matching surplus is xy = sup z ( xyz + xyz ) and this model embeds both the classical sorting model ( xyz = xy and xyz = xy ) and the hedonic model ( xyz = xz and xyz = yz ). The empirically interesting question there is to assess which of the "sorting e¤ect" or "hedonic e¤ect"is strongest.
